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Introduction  
‘Revenge porn’, as the non-consensual distribution of private sexual images and 
videos has been termed,1 is conceptualised as an inextricably modern phenomenon which the 
law is not appropriately equipped to deal with.2 The advent of smartphone technology has 
ensured that sexually explicit material can be created easily (with or without the knowledge 
of all parties)3 and disseminated quickly.4 An increasing number of individuals (generally, 
though not necessarily, women)4 have fallen victim to this phenomenon in recent years. This 
has led to calls for legislative intervention.5 Many academics and campaigners have taken the 
view that the publication of such material deserves to incur punishment by the criminal law.6   
In England and Wales, legislative intervention of this kind has occurred in the form 
of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015.7 This Act criminalises individuals who “disclose 
private sexual photographs and films with intent to cause distress”. 8  In 2016, similar 
legislation was passed by the Scottish Parliament, 9  with regulations giving effect to the 
                                                   
1 Keith B. Darrell, Issues in Internet Law: Society, Technology, and the Law, (9th Ed.) (Amber Book Co., 2014)  
2 Sarah Jeong, Revenge Porn Is Bad. Criminalizing It Is Worse, (Wired, 28/10/2013)   
3 Creating sexually explicit material has been described as a ‘new and popular way of expressing sexuality’ by  
Ndeunyema: See Ndjodi Ndeunyema, Addressing ‘Revenge Porn’ in Namibia, (OxHRH Blog, 5 June 2015) 
<http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/addressing-revenge-porn-in-namibia/> [Accessed 5/6/2015]. With that said, such 
material may be created without the knowledge or consent of the eventual victim. 4 Ndjodi Ndeunyema, 
Addressing ‘Revenge Porn’ in Namibia, (OxHRH Blog, 5 June 2015) <http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/addressing-
revenge-porn-in-namibia/> [Accessed 5/6/2015]  
4 Indeed, the first person charged with distributing revenge porn in England was a woman: See The Independent,  
Josie Cunningham charged for allegedly posting revenge porn on Twitter, (Thursday 14 May 2015) See also  
Jessica Valenti, It's still Revenge Porn when the victim is a man and the picture is of his penis, (The Guardian, 
26/06/2014);  
5 Danielle Keats Citron and Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, [2014] Wake Forest L. Rev. 345  
6 Danielle Keats Citron and Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, [2014] Wake Forest L. Rev. 345  
7 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 c.2, ss.32-35  
8 Ibid. s.33; henceforth termed ‘the 2015 Act’  
9 The Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 
2  
  
provisions pertaining to ‘revenge porn’ entering into force as of the 24th of April 2017.10 
Those convicted of the crime of ‘disclosing, or threatening to disclose, an intimate 
photograph or film’11 now face up to 12 months in prison on summary conviction12 or 5 years 
in prison if convicted on indictment.13 
It is submitted that the potential for recourse to the criminal courts does not provide 
sufficient remedy for those affected by this conduct, however. Victims ought also to be 
considered to be due monetary redress in respect of the infringement of their privacy and their 
rights of personality via compensation by way of a civil law remedy. With that said, the 
damage done by ‘revenge porn’ need not necessarily be economic. Victims of ‘revenge porn’ 
are likely to suffer from severe emotional distress and upset (resultant psychological issues 
aside),14 but these injuries are non-patrimonial and the victim need not have suffered any 
noticeable or quantifiable loss. This can consequently make it difficult to frame an action for 
damages according to the common law.  
This article asks if the specific Romanistic delict iniuria might offer appropriate 
remedy in instances of ‘revenge porn’. The actio iniuriarum was, in the Roman law, a delict 
which served to protect the non-patrimonial aspects of a person’s existence – “who a person 
                                                   
10 The Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional 
Provision) Regulations 2017 
11 Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 s.2 
12 Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 s.2(7)(1) 
13 Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 s.2(7)(2) 
14 Ndjodi Ndeunyema, Addressing ‘Revenge Porn’ in Namibia, (OxHRH Blog, 5 June 2015)  
<http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/addressing-revenge-porn-in-namibia/> [Accessed 5/6/2015]  
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is rather than what a person has”15 – their physical body, their reputation and their esteem.16 
As the propagation of sexually explicit images of an individual without their consent is clearly 
an affront to the esteem of that individual,17  and is likely to significantly damage their 
reputation,18 it is submitted that victims of ‘revenge porn’ ought to be entitled to solatium. 
Furthermore, as it is submitted that an actio iniuriarum may be brought against anyone who 
shares and continues to propagate ‘revenge porn’, not merely the first person who uploads it, 
this paper also argues that the actio iniuriarum is a means by which victims of ‘revenge porn’ 
may discourage the continued spread of the offending material, even on the internet.  
The actio iniuriarum was unequivocally received into Scots law in the Institutional 
period,19 although Scotland’s connection with the action has since been neglected.20 There is 
currently conflicting academic opinion which holds that the doctrine is dead on the one hand21 
and that the doctrine still has a part to play in the development of Scots law on the other.22 In 
light of the fact that the Outer House explicitly found it necessary to make use of the actio 
iniuriarum in deciding the 2006 case of Stevens v Yorkhill NHS Trust,23 this article takes the 
                                                   
15 Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmerman, Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective, 
(Dundee: DUP, 2009) para.1.2.1  
16 The term ‘esteem’ is preferred here due to the fact that, as noted by Professor Norrie, the concept of ‘honour’ 
ought to be treated, by the law, with a degree of suspicion: See Kenneth McKenzie Norrie, The Actio Iniuriarum 
in Scots Law: Romantic Romanism, or Tool for Today? In Iniuria and the Common Law  
17 In the words of Sheriff Andrew Mackie, the posting of ‘revenge porn’ is ‘a gross invasion of [the] victim’: See 
BBC News, Stanley Gibbs jailed for filming naked images of female friend, (09/06/2015)  
18 The Guardian, US woman pursues ex-boyfriend in landmark UK revenge-porn action, (3/6/2015)  
19 Case Comment, Actio Iniuriarum and Human Organ Retention, [2007] Edin L. R. 5 
20 Kenneth McKenzie Norrie, The Actio Iniuriarum in Scots Law: Romantic Romanism, or Tool for Today? In 
Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013)  
21 Elspeth C. Reid, Protection of Personality Rights in the Modern Scots Law of Delict, in Niall R. Whitty and 
Reinhard Zimmerman, Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective, (Dundee: DUP, 2009)  
22 Kenneth McKenzie Norrie, The Actio Iniuriarum in Scots Law: Romantic Romanism, or Tool for Today? In  
Iniuria and the Common Law; see also Tammo Wallinga, Review of Iniuria and the Common Law, [2014] 
Roman Legal Tradition 46-50, p.47  
23 [2006] CSOH 143 
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latter view and argues that the actio iniuriarum still offers scope for a robust doctrine of 
‘rights of personality’24 to develop in Scots law. There is no reason to eschew the use of old 
law in the face of new problems. Since ‘revenge porn’ is a contemporaneous challenge which 
the law now faces, unimagined in bygone days, this article submits that it is entirely 
appropriate that the Scottish actio iniuriarum should develop to protect the privacy and 
dignity of individuals in contemporary Scots law, given Scotland’s Romano-Dutch heritage.  
It is submitted that the provision of solatium is absolutely appropriate in instances of 
‘revenge porn’ and that the law of Scotland ought to move to recognise this, given that the 
present remedies which the court can offer are lacking. This paper shall establish that such 
actions clearly fall within the scope of iniuria as it is understood in historic and contemporary 
Scots law and argue that the particular and peculiar problems associated with actions arising 
out of ‘revenge porn’ cases can be addressed under this heading.  
The actio iniuriarum is a product of the Civilian legal tradition. There is no equivalent 
in the Common law system.25 With that said, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
introduces a protection akin to that offered by the actio iniuriarum to those living under 
English law;26 consequently, this article also considers whether or not a civil claim may be 
brought in England, Wales or Northern Ireland under this statutory heading. The 1997 Act 
applies in Scotland, although the applicable provisions are slightly different in this 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, as “most conduct which falls foul of the Act in Scotland is likely to 
                                                   
24 Used here to describe rights of protection against threats to physical integrity, personal liberty, reputation, 
privacy and confidentiality: See Elspeth Christie Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law, 
(W. Green, 2010) para.1.02  
25 Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 
2013), introduction, passim.  
26 Francois du Bois, Harassment: A Wrong Without a Right, in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and 
the Common Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013)  
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fall foul of the Act in England, and vice versa”,27 this article also considers the likelihood of 
a claim for redress in relation to ‘revenge porn’ succeeding under this statutory heading in 
Scotland.  
Ultimately, it is submitted that victims of ‘revenge porn’ ought to be entitled to civil 
remedy, whether this ought to be paid under the statutory heading of harassment or the 
according to the traditional actio iniuriarum. Although it is clear that a number of practical 
problems will remain, given the complex nature of this new phenomenon and the reality of 
the internet, it is hoped that the requirement to provide civil compensation may serve to 
deter potential perpetrators of ‘revenge porn’.  
Defining ‘Revenge Porn 
For the purposes of this article, ‘revenge porn’ is understood as the non-consensual 
publication of sexually explicit material, such as photographs or videos, in order to cause 
distress or harm to the subject. The motive for the publication of the material need not be 
‘revenge’, in spite of this title; the phrase ‘revenge porn’ here is to be understood as referring 
to any non-consensual publication of sexual material.28 This definition has found usage in 
official29 and unofficial dictionaries30 and has been adopted by academics for the purposes of 
setting out a precise meaning of ‘revenge porn’.31 In addition to this definition, however, it is 
                                                   
27 Per Sheriff Braid, Dickie v Flexicon Glenrothes Ltd. Unreported, August 6, 2007, Kirkcaldy Sheriff Court, 
noted at 2009 G.W.D 35-602  
28 Although it may be suggested that the term ‘non-consensual pornography’ is to be preferred to the term 
‘revenge porn’, since the latter makes no assumption with regard to the motive of the perpetrator, the term 
‘revenge porn’ has nevertheless found use, albeit as a colloquialism, in academic (and multimedia) discourse 
which is not solely concerned with instances where the perpetrator’s motive was purely revenge: See Rachel 
Hill, Cyber-Misogyny: Should ‘Revenge Porn’ be Regulated in Scotland, and if so, How? [2015] 12:2 SCRIPTed 
117: <https://script-ed.org/?p=2113>. The term ‘revenge porn’ is thus used in this article, as in others, in the 
understanding that it is a colloquialism which serves as shorthand for a complex phenomenon.  
29  Such as the Oxford English Dictionary: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/revenge_porn 
30  Such as the Urban Dictionary: http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=revenge%20porn 
31  See Jenna K. Stokes, The Indecent Internet: Resisting Unwarranted Internet Exceptionalism in Combating 
Revenge Porn, [2014] Berkeley Tech. L.j. 929, wherein the author makes use of the Webster’s dictionary 
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submitted that sexually explicit material shared without the consent of the subject depicted 
in the material, for the sole purpose of offering gratification to others or, indeed, for any other 
purpose, should also fall within the definition of ‘revenge porn’. 32  As it is the fact of 
publication without consent that truly reflects the harm of ‘revenge porn’ – the “gross 
invasion of the victim” spoken of by Sheriff Mackie – it is thought that any sexually explicit 
content uploaded to the internet or otherwise published without the subject’s consent is to be 
properly regarded as ‘revenge porn’. The stated or purported purpose of the publisher, if at 
all relevant, is ancillary to any claim (at most); the fact that the victim subsequently felt hurt 
or upset is more significant to any claim for solatium. 
This expanded definition would allow instances such as the publication of nude 
photographs of Jennifer Lawrence to be rightly regarded as actionable33 – leaving aside the 
complications of international private law, which are beyond the scope of this paper – and 
would more properly align with the understanding of the scope and purpose of the delict 
iniuria presented in this paper. As shall be demonstrated throughout this article, all forms of 
the actio iniuriarum – in Roman, South African and Scots law – would permit a claim for 
solatium in any instance of the above, albeit that each system might utilise differing taxonomy 
in classifying the harm caused. A celebrity who has suffered a form of online ‘hacking’ has 
as much of a claim against the perpetrators and publishers of ‘revenge porn’ as an ex-lover 
                                                   
definition. See also Taylor Linkous, It's Time for Revenge Porn to Get a Taste of Its Own Medicine: An Argument 
for the Federal Criminalization of Revenge Porn, [2014] Rich. J.L. & Tech., wherein the author draws on the 
Urban Dictionary in defining ‘revenge porn’ for the purposes of their article. 
32  Indeed, this broader definition finds favour in the Collins English dictionary: See 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/revenge-porn 
33 Ms. Lawrence’s Instagram account was ‘hacked’, allowing the ‘hackers’ to gain access to private material 
which she had shared with her then-boyfriend: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/jennifer-lawrence-
on-4chan-nude-hacking-scandal-the-internet-has-scorned-me-9856364.html; 
https://www.theguardian.com/film/2017/jan/24/jennifer-lawrence-nude-photo-hacker-edward-majerczyk-
prison 
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who created or consensually received the ‘revenge porn’ material, given the breadth and 
flexibility of the law of delict and the actio iniuriarum therein.  
The Actio Iniuriarum and the Essence of ‘Iniuria’  
The actio iniuriarum has consistently received far less academic attention than actions 
brought under the lex Aquilia, both in the Roman writings and in contemporary scholarship.34 
The lex Aquilia served to offer remedy to those who suffered proprietary damage and to 
compensate those who suffered damnum. The concept of the actio legis Aquiliae recrudesced 
during the second life of Roman law and even exhibited influence on the Common law 
tradition during the foundational period of that legal family.35 The actio iniuriarum, on the 
other hand, was concerned with protecting individuals from injury to their person and enjoyed 
a ‘less than triumphant fate’ during the second life.36   
The term ‘iniuria’ is etymologically complex. Justinian ascribed several meanings to 
it, stating that it may denote any act done without legal justification,37 the specific wrong done 
by a judge who imposes an unjust sentence,38 an act implying dolus or culpa under the lex 
Aquilia39 – commonly recognised in the damnum iniuria datum – or an act which causes 
compensable affront to another.40 The last of these represents the specific delict ‘iniuria’; a 
                                                   
34 Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart,  
35 Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart,  
36 Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 
2013)  
37 ‘Iniuria dicitur omne quod non iure fit’: Justinian, Institutes, 4.4   
38 Justinian, Institutes, 4.4  
39 Reinhard Zimmermann, Actio Iniuriarum, in The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian 
Tradition,   
40 See Justinian, Institutes, 4.4; Dig. 47.10; C. 9.35. See also M. Kaster, Das Romische Privatrecht, I (Munich: 
Beck, 1955) pp.21-22; 139-140; 520-522  
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contumelious attack on the dignity of a freeman, which may give rise to a compensable 
claim.41  
Contumelia, 42  which has been variously defined as ‘insult’, 43  ‘contempt’, 44  and 
‘disrespect’,45 lay at the heart of the Roman delict of iniuria46 and, thus, their conception of 
the actio iniuriarum.47 The use of the term ‘insult’, in understanding contumelia, has been 
favoured by some English writers, as this allows those writers to draw a ready parallel 
between verbal attacks in the Roman law and the English law of tort.48 This approach is ill-
advised;49 the Romans understood the concept of iniuria as the Greeks understood their 
concept of hubris,50 to which the closest English language analogue is ‘contempt’, indicating 
a lack of respect for the personality of another.51 The Romanist Professor Ibbetson therefore 
suggests that the best translation of contumelia may be ‘disrespect’,52 though current Scottish 
                                                   
41 R.W Leage, Leage’s Roman Law, p.417; Dig. 47.10.2  
42 Dig. 47.10: The wrong stems from ‘quod non iure fiat: omne enim, quod non iure fit, iniuria fieri dicitur. hoc 
generaliter. specialiter autem iniuria dicitur contumelia’.  
43 J. Paul Sampley and Peter Lampe, Paul and Rhetoric  
44 Peter Birks, Harassment and Hubris: The Right to an Equality of Respect, [1997] Irish Jurist 1  
45 David Ibbetson, Iniuria, Roman and English, in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common 
Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013)  
46 Dig. 47.10.15.46 
47 David Ibbetson, Iniuria, Roman and English, in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common 
Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013) p.40 
48 David Ibbetson, Iniuria, Roman and English, in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common 
Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013) p.40 
49 No least because the South African courts expressly rejected this interpretation of contumelia and iniuria in 
Foulds v Smith 1950 1 SA 1 (A), 11; see also Neethling, Potgieter and Visser, Neethling’s Law of Personality, 
(Durban: Butterworths, 1996) p.240 
50 Justinian, Institutes, Book III, Tit.IV  
51 Peter Birks, Harassment and Hubris: The Right to an Equality of Respect, [1997] Irish Jurist 1, p.8  
52 David Ibbetson, Iniuria, Roman and English, in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common 
Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013), p.40 
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jurisprudence appears to suggest that the Scots judiciary prefers to interpret the word as 
‘affront’.53   
In the post-classical period of Roman law, contumelious intent to effect affront could 
cause otherwise lawful conduct to be considered iniuria both in the sense of ‘unlawful 
conduct’ and in the sense of the specific delict.54 In the words of Professors Descheemaeker 
and Scott, ‘as long as the wrongdoer’s purpose was to bring his victim into disrepute, his 
conduct – whatever it was – was potentially actionable.’55  
By the classical period of Roman law, one could inflict iniuria and exhibit contumelia 
by words or by a physical act56 and the affront caused to one’s corpus, fama and dignitas was 
the essence of actions in respect of verbal injury just as for iniuria realis  - injuries which 
would contemporaneously be understood as ‘assault’. 57  The classical Romans and their 
successors therefore recognised that reparation could be owed in respect of both physical and 
verbal attacks under the actio iniuriarum.58  
Verbal Injury (Iniuria Verbalis)  
Just as the Roman law recognised iniuria verbalis in the context of the actio 
iniuriarum, so too does English law recognise the concept of verbal injury in the torts of 
                                                   
53 Stevens v Yorkhill NHS Trust [2006] CSOH 143 
54 Eric Descheemaeker, ‘A man of bad character has not so much to lose’: Truth as a defence in the  
South African law of defamation, [2011] South African Law Journal 452; Peter Birks, Harassment and Hubris: 
The Right to an Equality of Respect, [1997] Irish Jurist 1, p.8  
55 Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 
2013), p.13  
56 Dig. 47.10.1  
57 Blackie, Unity in Diversity, in Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmerman, Rights of Personality in Scots Law: 
A Comparative Perspective, (Dundee: DUP, 2009)  
58 Dig. 47.10.2  
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slander and libel.59 There is no unified tort of defamation,6061 but the two separate torts offer 
some protection to those defamed and “in general, an action lies for the malicious publication 
of statements which are false in fact and injurious to the character of another’. 62  The 
malicious publication of sexual images and videos is clearly not actionable as slander63 and 
it is not generally actionable as libel, unless the propagation of the offending images is 
accompanied by a false statement or a malicious innuendo.64 With that said, the term ‘words’, 
in statute, has been interpreted in such a way so as to include both ‘pictures and visual 
images’.65 Thus, it is submitted that any wrong involving the unauthorised publication of a 
picture or video ought to be understood as a verbal, as opposed to ‘real’, injury, particularly 
as ‘real’ injuries are typically only those which involve physical acts.66 
While the essential elements of defamation in the form of libel may ostensibly apply 
to instances of ‘revenge porn’, and one can construct at least a prima facie case in every 
instance,67 one cannot construct a definite case in every instance. Any libellous statement 
                                                   
59 D. Oswald Dykes, Cooper on Defamation and Verbal Injury, (Edinburgh: W. Green and Sons, 1906)   
60 Alistair Mullis, The Law of Defamation, in Andrew Grubb (Ed.) The Law of Tort, (London: Buttersworth,  
61 ) para.24.24; in Scotland, there is no distinction between slander and defamation in delict: Kenneth McK  
Norrie, Defamation and Related Actions in Scots Law, (Edinburgh: Butterworths, 1995)  
62 Toogood v Spyring (1834) 1 CM & R 181 , p.193  
63 Simply because slander is defined as a ‘defamatory communication conveyed in some non-permanent form’; 
the publication of revenge porn online is clearly a permanent fixture, given the nature of the internet: See Peter 
Druschel, Michael Backes, Rodica Tirtea, The Right To Be Forgotten – Between Expectations And Practice, 
[2011] ENISA Report pp.8-9  
64 Monson v Tussauds Ltd [1894] 1 QB 671, p.692; Du Bost v Beresford (1810) 2 Camp 511; Kenneth McK 
Norrie, Defamation and Related Actions in Scots Law, (Edinburgh: Butterworths, 1995) p.13  
65 Theatres Act 1968 s.4(3) 
66 See John Blackie, The Protection of Corpus in Scots Law, in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and 
the Common Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013), p.157 
67 The essential elements of a cause of action being (a) that the statement/implication was defamatory; (b) that 
the statement/implication was published to at least a third person; and (c) that the statement/implication referred 
to the claimant: Alistair Mullis, The Law of Defamation, in Andrew Grubb (Ed.) The Law of Tort, (London: 
Buttersworth, 2002) para.24.8  
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must necessarily be false68 and so while one may be able to establish libel if the images were 
posted with an implication that the subject of the attack was a ‘slut’, or a ‘whore’ or suchlike,69 
however this implication may be imputed,70  in the absence of this innuendo the simply 
publication of private images will not be actionable under this heading, however great the 
actual damage to the victim’s reputation. 71  According to English law, veritas non est 
defamatio;72 if an individual publishes an intimate image without the consent of the subject 
of that image in an instance of ‘revenge porn’, but does not add a defamatory statement (be 
it a statement or an innuendo) when doing so, the subject of the illicitly published material 
will have no recourse under the law of libel.73  
With that said, any publication which implies that a woman is not chaste was 
specifically actionable as a result of statutory intervention74 until the Slander of Women Act 
was repealed by the Defamation Act 201375 (a comparable publication concerning a man 
would not have been actionable under the legislation).76 As ‘revenge porn’ is clearly injurious 
to the character of the victim, and as it obviously implies a lack of chastity,77 there would 
                                                   
68 Sutherland v Stopes [1925] AC 47, p.62; Defamation Act 2013 c.26, s.2(1)  
69 As often (though not always) occurs in instances of ‘revenge porn’: See O. Rachmilovitz, Bringing Down the  
Bedroom Walls: Emphasising Substance over Form in Personalized Abuse, [2008] William and Mary Journal of 
Women and the Law 495, p.500: The law looks to the substance of words and actions when considering 
defamation; one cannot escape liability by ‘artfully’ disguising libel: D. Oswald Dykes, Cooper on Defamation 
and Verbal Injury, (Edinburgh: W. Green and Sons, 1906) p.29  
70 Kenneth McK Norrie, Defamation and Related Actions in Scots Law, (Edinburgh: Butterworths, 1995) p.13  
71 Sutherland v Stopes [1925] AC 47  
72 2 Selden Society 82 (1294)  
73  Defamation Act 2013 c.26, s.2; Kenneth McK Norrie, Defamation and Related Actions in Scots Law, 
(Edinburgh: Butterworths, 1995)  
74 Slander of Women Act 1891 c.51, s.1; Kerr v Kennedy [1942] 1 KB 411  
75 S.14(1)  
76  Mullis has argued that this incongruity may not be compatible with Articles 6 and 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Alistair Mullis, The Law of Defamation, in Andrew Grubb (Ed.) The Law of Tort, 
(London: Buttersworth, 2002) para.24.37, but this has not yet been tested.   
77 Per Kerr v Kennedy [1942] 1 KB 409: The test for establishing a lack of chastity is the question: "What 
imputations on a woman, qua woman, in the sphere of sexual morality, are grave enough to be actionable 
without proof of pecuniary loss, or so likely to cause pecuniary loss as not to call for such proof?", p.412 98 
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have been scope for one to argue that revenge porn ought to be actionable according to the 
tort of libel using this Act, though this would hardly have been a satisfactory means of 
prohibiting the propagation of revenge porn, as forcing a woman to accept that she is 
‘unchaste’ in the pursuit of a legitimate grievance appears to be a blatant instance of ‘victim 
blaming’.98 Victims of revenge porn can never be regarded as ‘ideal victims’78 and so those 
who upload such material routinely regard their conduct as justifiable on grounds that the 
victim ‘had it coming’ as a form of ‘shame punishment’.79 To suggest that a statute such as 
the Slander of Women Act ought to be used to curtail revenge porn plays into the victim 
blaming narrative by implicitly suggesting that no woman should ever be involved in the 
creation of private sexually explicit material.   
Accordingly, libel is not a wholly satisfactory foundation on which to rest all actions 
against revenge porn. The tort of ‘breach of confidence’ may, however, offer better recourse 
in the English law. Though the English courts have hitherto avoided creating a specific or 
defined tort to protect privacy,80 they have nevertheless recognised that there are occasions 
on which the publication of private images or information may be actionable;81 if one is under 
a ‘duty of confidence’, then one is bound not to publish or otherwise disseminate information 
which is held in confidence.82 As such, given the private nature of sexual relations, the 
assumed level of mutual trust and respect in sexual relationships and the intimate nature of 
                                                   
Silke Meyer, Still blaming the victim of intimate partner violence? Women’s narratives of victim desistance 
and redemption when seeking support, [2015] Theoretical Criminology 1  
78 Nils Christie, The ideal victim, in: Ezzat Fattah (ed.) From Crime Policy to Victim Policy, (Basingstoke: 
MacMillan, 1986) 17–30; at p.19  
79  M.C Nussbaum, Objectification and Internet Misogyny, in The Offensive Internet: Speech, Privacy and 
Reputation, (Harvard University Press, 2012) p.68  
80 Kaye v Robertson [1991] F.S.R 62  
81 Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 2 De. G & Sm. 652  
82 Coco v An Clark (Engineers) Ltd. (1968) F.S.R. 415, p.419  
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homemade sexual images or videos, one may legitimately claim that a sexual partner is legally 
bound under a duty of confidence to refrain from sharing sexually intimate material, whether 
such content is sent to them by their partner or created by them personally.   
The problem with using breach of confidentiality as an action for remedy in instances 
of ‘revenge porn’ is readily apparent. It may be used against the sexual partner who initially 
shares the intimate material, but once the material is published on the internet it may be 
readily and lawfully shared by others who are not bound by the duty of confidentiality. Breach 
of confidentiality offers remedy when there has been ‘[a]n intrusion – an unbecoming and 
unseemly intrusion…offensive to that inbred sense of propriety natural to every man’,83 but 
one cannot claim for any intrusion beyond the initial breach of confidence. This action cannot 
therefore be used to prevent the spread of intimate images which have already been uploaded 
into the public domain.  
Roman law offers more comprehensive, and more appropriate, protection from verbal 
injury than the English common law by dint of the actio iniuriarum. The actio iniuriarum 
allows for one to found an action based on insult alone; this cannot be done under the English 
law.84 A successful claim under the actio iniuriarum requires no more than that the real or 
verbal injury inflicted on an individual’s personality interests be caused contumeliously.85 
There is no requirement for falsity in a verbal attack and so the problems which are inherent 
in raising an action for libel are not encountered. The complexities of breach of confidentiality 
                                                   
83 Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 2 De. G & Sm. 652, p.698  
84 Kenneth McK Norrie, Defamation and Related Actions in Scots Law, (Edinburgh: Butterworths, 1995) p.2  
85 ‘The Actio Iniuriarum offered a strong and efficient protection against injuries to immaterial interests, and in 
particular against insulting behaviour of any kind’; Reinhard Zimmerman, The Law of Obligations: Roman 
Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, (Oxford: OUP, 1996)p.1062; see also the case of Le Roux v Dey (CCT 
45/10) [2011] ZACC 4 para.113 wherein the South African Constitutional Court, citing Kimpton v Rhodesian 
Newspapers Ltd. 1924 AD 755 interpreted contumelia to mean something which can be considered ‘insulting, 
offensive or degrading to another’.  
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roneed not be contended with; there is no need to establish that a perpetrator was bound by 
any specific duty to refrain from disclosing anything, thus anyone who subsequently and 
contumeliously shares intimate material may be pursued by a claimant. The actio iniuriarum, 
in Roman, Scots and South African law, consequently can be said to offer greater protection 
to the victim of ‘revenge porn’ than one pursuing an action founded in breach of confidence.    
It is not difficult to extend the protection from verbal injury offered in respect of the 
contumelious publication of harsh words to verbal injury caused by the contumelious 
publication and propagation of intimate images, as the English experience demonstrates. 
English law expressly recognises that one may be defamed by the publication of libellous 
pictures as well as by false statements;86 South African law similarly recognise that one may 
suffer iniuria verbalis as a result of the malicious publication of photographs.87 It is therefore 
quite clear that, even if one takes the strict view that contumelia is a separable element of 
iniuria which must be proven along with animus iniuriandi and the fact that the conduct 
committed was contra bonos mores, all ‘revenge porn’ cases could be actionable according 
to the Roman actio iniuriarum. ‘Revenge porn’ is almost a textbook example of improper 
shaming and, as the victims are generally rendered infamis, as the Romans would have 
understood that term, it is accordingly evident that any claim made by them would be, prima 
facie, competent. Animus iniuriandi could easily be established in most, if not all, such cases: 
The intention behind maliciously uploading and sharing intimate images and videos is 
obviously to affront or degrade the subject of the material, to say nothing of any breach of 
confidence or expectation of privacy. Contumelia is clearly present wherever consent is 
                                                   
86 Monson v Tussauds Ltd. [1894] 1 QB 671; at p.678  
87 O’Keefe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co. 1954 (3) S.A 244 C; malice is not, of course, a requirement, 
although it is submitted that any instance in which malice can be shown would certainly be actionable.  
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blatantly disregarded. Violating the sexual autonomy or integrity of an individual goes against 
the basic moral fabric of contemporary society and can undoubtedly be considered adversus 
bonos mores.88   
The Roman understanding of the actio iniuriarum does not provide an accurate 
account of the modern law in either Scotland or South Africa, however. As both of these 
jurisdictions were greatly influenced by both the ius commune jurists and the Anglo-
American tradition, and both received something closer to Romano-Dutch law rather than 
‘pure’ Roman law, their concept of the actio iniuriarum is rather different from the conceptual 
framework of the delict discussed above. In addition, in spite of their shared heritage, both 
jurisdictions have treated the action in very different ways; Scotland has neglected her 
connection to the ius commune, South Africa has embraced it. Accordingly, this paper shall 
presently consider the place of the actio iniuriarum in South African law, before 
comparatively analysing the same within the context of Scots law.  
Rights of Personality and the Actio Iniuriarum  
Although the actio iniuriarum (appearing in its modern form as the actio injuriarum) 
was received into those jurisdictions which have been influenced by the Romanistic tradition, 
its presence is now merely residual in some Civilian legal systems.89 In the mixed jurisdiction 
of South Africa, however, the actio iniuriarum has thrived and, while the delict made rather 
                                                   
88 Professor Blackie has suggested that the law ought to recognise a right to sexual integrity in civil cases and 
that the delict of iniuria offers an opportunity to do this. Although, here, his discussion is limited to matters 
which affect the physical body, it is apparent that this analysis may be extended beyond corpus (a term used in 
a more inclusive sense than Ulpian’s, in Blackie’s essay) to fama and dignitas as well: John Blackie, The 
Protection of Corpus in Scots law, in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, 
(Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013), pp.166-167  
89 Such as in France, where the action has been “squeezed of its substance”: see Eric Descheemaeker and  
Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013), p.26  
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‘staccato progress in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’,90  it now stands alongside 
Aquilian liability and the action for pain and suffering as one of the pillars of the South 
African law of obligations.91  
As the lex Aquilia did somewhat influence English law in its developmental period, 
the word iniuria is also familiar to most English lawyers. With that said, however, the actio 
iniuriarum has no ready counterpart in the history of Common law jurisdictions.113 The 
closest equivalent would be found in the early law of trespass,92 but this is a weak comparator. 
The Anglo-American tradition has come to favour a ‘pigeonhole system of nominate torts’ in 
preference to the broad blanket of delictual liability preferred in the Civilian tradition93 and 
accordingly, as there is nothing akin to the Romanistic iniuria in the Common law tradition, 
any attempt to understand the modern, South African notion of iniuria through the lens of a 
single, nominate action is impossible.94 In addition, trespass does not and has never protected 
personality rights as the actio iniuriarum has done.  
The phrase “the English law of tort” is itself something of a misnomer.95 England 
does not really have a law of tort, per se, but rather a law of torts. This slight semantic 
difference is no mere matter of pedantry; English law recognises only a finite, distinct and 
                                                   
90 Jonathan M. Burchell, The Protection of Personality Rights, in Zimmerman and Visser, Southern Cross: Civil 
Law and Common Law in South Africa, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)  
91 J. Neethling, J.M Potgieter and P.J Visser, Law of Delict, (4th Edition) (Durban: Butterworths, 2001) p.8 113 
Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 
2013)  
92 David Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations, (Oxford: OUP, 1999) pp.13-17; 39-43; 
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93 F. F. Stone, Touchstones of Tort Liability, [1950] Stan. L. R. 259, p.283   
94 Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 
2013)  
95 Discussion in T.B Smith, A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland, (1962) p.658  
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nominate number of ‘wrongs’ which are actionable.96 Actions which infringe dignity do not 
fit within any of these ‘torticles’.97 The South African law of delict, conversely, is very much 
that: An unbroken system which recognises a potentially infinite number of wrongs as it 
regards as actionable anything which does injury to an individual’s corpus, fama or dignitas 
and it will order reparation in respect of damnum iniuria datum. Between its connection to 
the Common law and the ius commune, South Africa has developed a unique system of civil 
law to protect personality rights.98 It has done so using the same sources available to Scottish 
jurists, albeit to far greater effect. Thus, though South Africa has not yet passed any legislation 
to exclusively proscribe or prevent the publication of ‘revenge porn’, victims of it are afforded 
some effective legal recourse. In addition to the potential for a civil claim in respect of the 
infringement of one’s privacy or personality rights,99 since the propagation of ‘revenge porn’ 
is an example of an occurrence which unlawfully and seriously impairs the dignity of the 
victim, the conduct is also criminalised by way of the crimen injuria.100 
The South African law of defamation has been greatly influenced by the Anglo-
American tradition.101 It does not, however, strictly divide the delict of defamation into the 
torts of slander and libel and so its law remains profoundly Civilian in this respect. Nor is 
their legal practice akin to that of England; in South Africa, the maxim veritas convicii non 
                                                   
96 F. F Stone, Touchstones of Tort Liability, [1950] Stanford Law Review 259  
97 Bernard Rudden, Torticles, [1991] 6/7 Tul. Civ. L.F. 105  
98 Jonathan M. Burchell, The Protection of Personality Rights, in Zimmerman and Visser, Southern Cross:  
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excusat has become entrenched, although there is a ‘dissenting strand’,102 which is English in 
substance if not in root,103 which maintains that truth is a defence for any claim of convicium 
or defamation.  With that said, in spite of its connection to the Common law, the method by 
which privacy is protected by non-defamatory actions in South Africa would be 
unrecognisable to an English lawyer. ‘Though publication is regarded as an element for the 
purposes of this aspect of the infringement of privacy, it does not follow that the wrong is 
founded on the same base as defamation. Defamation consists of an attack on reputation 
resulting from publication while infringement of privacy is grounded in an impairment of 
dignitas.’104  
Scotland, although heavily influenced by the Common law tradition in its law of  
‘personality rights’, has a well-established, foundational connection to the actio iniuriarum. 
Bankton called on it by name105 and Stair had earlier alluded to a general obligation of 
reparation which appears to have been influenced by the concept.106 Yet with that said, the 
law pertaining to the protection of personality rights in Scotland ‘remains a thing of shreds 
and patches’;107 that particular jurisdiction has not built up robust doctrines designed to 
protect privacy as comparable Civilian jurisdictions have done.108 Unlike South Africa, which 
used its connection to the ius commune to great effect, Scotland grossly mistreated the actio 
                                                   
102 To use the words of Professor Descheemaeker in his study on the subject: See Eric Descheemaeker, ‘A man 
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iniuriarum throughout the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,109 during which 
time her lawyers began to eschew its Civilian roots in favour of the English Common law.110   
The Civilian tradition had come, in the nineteenth century, to be associated with 
dictatorship, while the Common law tradition was viewed by Scots as progressive, liberal and 
preferable to the repressive Romanist regime. 111  This reflected a trend whereby it was 
thought, quite simply, that it was “time to close the old books”.112 As a result of this, although 
Scots law had the potential to develop a full-blooded, hearty system of personality and privacy 
rights, no such structure was realised. The Scots law of ‘personality rights’ developed, and 
has continued to develop, in a manner akin to English law.113   
As noted, English law does not naturally recognise any ‘high-level principle’ 
protecting privacy or personality rights;134 its practical focus and endemic distrust of legal 
academia precluded the development of any doctrine in this direction114 until the European  
Convention on Human Rights was adopted into domestic law.115 The importance of the 
Scottish actio iniuriarum has, accordingly, been very much diluted over the years,116 however 
it must be noted that unlike English law, which has struggled to cope with the reception of 
the Article 8 right to privacy into domestic law, Scots law at least has the potential to draw 
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on the South African innovation of treating one’s privacy as an aspect of one’s dignitas and 
protecting it by dint of the actio iniuriarum.117  
Iniuria initially had a role to play in both the civil law of delict and the criminal law, 
but as the nominate delict and crime of assault emerged, its importance in the criminal sphere 
deteriorated into desuetude.118 It does, however, remain within the framework of the Scottish 
civil law. 119  Just as delict in South Africa remains an unbroken system which acts to 
compensate those who suffer as a result of culpa, so too can the Scottish law of delict act to 
compensate those who suffer loss or injury as a result of an indefinite number of intentional 
or unintentional wrongs.120  
Iniuria, within the context of the actio iniuriarum, is generally understood as ‘injury’ 
caused by ‘affront’ in the Scots literature on the subject and in Scottish jurisprudence.121 This 
allowed Professor Whitty to persuasively argue that the three Scottish post-mortem cases122 
were clearly decided according to the logic of the actio iniuriarum on grounds to the judicial 
reference to ‘affront’ made in them, in spite of the fact that the delict of iniuria was not 
expressly mentioned in any of these cases.123 One year later, a Scottish Outer House case 
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expressly vindicated his argument124 and ultimately held that the law of Scotland continues 
to recognise actions for affront and hurt feelings under the actio iniuriarum.125 In such cases, 
a court may order that solatium must be paid, although this solatium is ‘a different animal’ to 
that awarded for physical or psychiatric injury.126  
Scots law therefore has an intrinsic advantage over English law as a result of its 
connection to the actio iniuriarum. In 2003, Lord Bonomy recognised that a right to privacy 
could be fashioned from existing principles of the Scots law and that, in the course of the case 
of Martin v McGuiness, counsel did not direct him to any authority which suggested that 
Scots law was as inimical to the concept of privacy rights as English law.127 In the case of 
Murray v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd, however, Lord Thomson maintained that he knew 
‘of no authority to the effect that mere invasion of privacy, however hurtful and whatever its 
purpose and however repugnant to good taste, is itself actionable”.128   
In spite of Lord Thomson’s comments, the possibility of action where animus 
iniuriandi can be established remains open.129 According to Professor Smith, if the pursuer 
who alleged a breach of privacy in Murray had been “subjected to contumely beyond the 
ambit of comment on his public activities,” then “a remedy might well have been competent.  
Mere lack of precedent should be no obstacle and in most civilised countries some protection 
is afforded by the law in respect of a citizen’s private life.”130  
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The promulgation is ‘revenge porn’ is not simply a mere invasion of privacy. It 
seriously infringes the dignitas of the victim and accordingly any affront to the victim’s 
privacy is necessarily connected to this infringement of dignitas.131 ‘Revenge porn’ is, if 
nothing else, a contumelious verbal attack which effects affront. In the words of the 
institutional writer Erskine:   
‘A verbal injury, when it is pointed against a private person, consists in the uttering 
of contumelious words, which tend to vilify his character, or render it little or 
contemptible… 
The animus iniuriandi which is of the essence of this crime, being an act of the mind, must 
be inferred from presumptions; and, in general, it is presumed from the injurious words 
themselves, especially when they are made use of to hurt one in his moral character, or to 
fix some particular guilt upon him; as if one should give his neighbour the name of thief, 
cheat, 
liar etc…’132 
It must be noted that, like the Romans, Erskine considers that the perpetrator’s display 
of animus iniuriandi is intrinsically bound to the execution of the contumelious act itself.   
Consequently, as it is not difficult to substitute the phrase ‘injurious words’ for 
‘injurious material’ contemporaneously, as the English and South African experiences 
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indicate,133 it is evident that one can consider the uploading of sexually explicit material to 
the internet, in the absence of consent from the subject of the material, as a verbal attack on 
the basis of the actio iniuriarum according to Scots law. ‘Revenge porn’ is already judicially 
recognised as ‘an invasion… A gross invasion of the victim’.134 Accordingly, the publication 
of such material is clearly an affront to the dignitas of the victim, as well as being an invasion 
of their privacy and an attack on their fama. As the actio iniuriarum exists to confer solatium 
on those who suffer such affront, it is submitted that the victims of ‘revenge porn’ ought to 
be able to avail themselves of this legal mechanism.   
In addition to the harm effected by the plain publication of ‘revenge porn’, in the 
modern context, it would not be a stretch to place the word ‘slut’ before Erskine’s use of 
‘etc…’, or, indeed, to understand that indefinite nature of ‘etc…’ implicitly includes it within 
the list’s ambit. Thus, it is suggested that in addition to there being an action arising out of 
the affront caused by the plain publication of ‘revenge porn’, there is additional scope 
available to the law to categorise the publication of ‘revenge porn’ on websites which are 
explicitly designed to denigrate the subjects of such publications as a specific form of verbal 
injury in such a manner that the purported ‘truth’ or otherwise of the alleged verbal attack is 
immaterial to the claim. 
 Verbal injury, as a form of iniuriae, justifies a claim for solatium, here understood as 
the payment of compensation in recognition of the fact that a wrong has been committed. 
Loss, or lack thereof, is immaterial to such a claim. Although the dicta of Lord President 
Robertson appear to suggest that a verbal injury could be conceptualised as patrimonial loss 
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caused by a malicious statement,135 this view swims against the tide of over two-thousand 
years of scholarship.136 Almost all Civilian commentators, and all of the Scottish Institutional 
writers, base their understanding of iniuria verbalis on the Digest;137 accordingly there is no 
reason to suggest that verbal injury, in Scotland, means anything more than a compensable 
form of injury resulting from a verbal attack.  
In light of Lord Bonomy’s dicta, Professor Smith’s comments and Erskine’s 
understanding of iniuria verbalis, and in considering the recrudescence of the actio 
iniuriarum in Stevens v Yorkhill NHS Trust, it remains distinctly possible that the actio 
iniuriarum may be – indeed, ought to be, according to Smith’s view – properly revived. In 
Scotland, ‘[T]he proper scope of the actio iniuriarum has always been to deal with those many 
situations where there has been deliberate affront to the pursuer (or negligence so gross as 
to be the equivalent of intent) and the pursuer’s feelings have consequently been hurt. 
Damages are for non-patrimonial loss (solatium) and the malicious purpose of the defender 
is always relevant’.138 If this action is wholly forgotten, then a gap will form in Scots law and 
individuals who ought to be entitled to compensation may be denied remedy.  
This is evidenced by the case of Ward v Scotrail Railways Ltd.139 Therein, Lord Reed 
appeared to suggest (on the basis of English authority140 and a Scottish negligence case)141 
that mere emotional distress cannot be considered compensable by Scots law.142 The decision, 
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136 T.B Smith, A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland, (1962)  p.726  
137 Specifically Dig. 47.10  
138 T.B Smith, Damn, Injuria, Damn, 1972 S.L.T. (News) 125, p.126  
139 (1999) S.C 255   
140 R. v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison Ex p. Hague [1992] 1 A.C. 58  
141 Moffat v Secretary of State for Scotland 1995 S.L.T. 729  
142 Ibid. at p.259  
25  
  
therefore, ostensibly appears to entirely overlook the Romano-Dutch origins of Scots law and 
seems to merge two separate strands of the law of delict together by mistakenly equating the 
iniuria of the damnum iniuria datum in the law of negligence with iniuria in the context of 
the actio iniuriarum.   
This state of affairs arose as a result of the fact that counsel made no pleadings of 
deliberate intention or malice; had they done so, the claim for emotional distress would have 
been regarded as actionable (as the court appeared to concede).143 While it is evident that no 
action for fright or mere distress may be brought under an actio legis Aquiliae, or an action 
for negligence,144 as ‘affront’ is the salient feature of the actio iniuriarum, it is evident that 
intentionally inflicted iniuria ought to give rise to a claim for solatium where the conduct of 
the defender displays culpa, regardless of any loss suffered by the pursuer. Loss is a salient 
feature of the lex Aquilia, but not the actio iniuriarum. Solatium is payable to those who have 
been wronged by injurious conduct under the actio iniuriarum, even if the pursuer has 
suffered no loss or personal injury;145 thus, it is equally clear that one who suffers pure 
emotional distress ought to be considered compensable according to the actio iniuriarum.146  
As actual loss or damage is not essential for a claim to be raised under the actio 
iniuriarum, a pursuer need only aver and prove three things: conduct which violates a legally 
protected interest in personality, dignity, honour or reputation (i.e. a wrong), affront to, or 
aggression on, personality causing hurt to feelings and dolus – called, in this context, animus 
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iniuriandi.147 In all instances of ‘revenge porn’, all three of these elements may be easily 
established; it is therefore evident that the malicious dissemination of private, intimate images 
is a textbook example of an instance in which an actio iniuriarum ought to be available to a 
pursuer. Sharing such material in the absence of consent is an affront to the victim. Whether 
the perpetrator intends to cause affront or not is irrelevant; recklessly sharing private, sexually 
explicit material is so obviously wrong that animus iniuriandi can be inferred. It is almost 
self-evident that a victim of ‘revenge porn’ will suffer emotional hurt and thus be entitled to 
solatium.148 The malicious purpose of the propagator of revenge porn may be presumed, 
particularly in instances in which the images in question are uploaded to sites specifically 
designed to shame the subjects in the pictures, but also where the perpetrator places the 
images on public fora such as social media sites.  
In concluding that the actio iniuriarum was no mere ‘romantic Romanism’, Professor 
Norrie maintained that the Scottish courts could, if they deemed it desirable, build upon the 
concept of iniuria once more, in order to provide solatium in ‘appropriate contexts’.149 It is 
evident that instances of ‘revenge porn’ represent such an ‘appropriate context’. Although 
contemporary society no longer considers verbal injury and name-calling to have any 
‘socially destructive potency’,150 the hurt caused by the propagation of ‘revenge porn’ is 
socially destructive. It represents a violation of the sexual freedom of the victim, as well as a 
callous disregard for their privacy. The publication and propagation of ‘revenge porn’ is 
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undoubtedly a deliberate affront; to reiterate the words of Sheriff Mackie, it is ‘a gross 
invasion of [the] victim’.151  
Consequently, it is clear that, in spite of the fact that the actio iniuriarum has been 
neglected by Scots law, the Scottish actio iniuriarum may theoretically be used to provide 
remedy for victims of ‘revenge porn’. The ‘pure’ Roman law would have regarded ‘revenge 
porn’ as a compensable iniuria, had the publication and promulgation of sexual photographs 
and videos been possible in antiquity, and South African law does evidently offer solatium to 
victims of contumelious publication of such material. There is, therefore, no reason for 
Scotland to eschew use of its familial connection to Rome and South Africa in addressing 
contemporaneous societal problems such as ‘revenge porn’; indeed, as the European 
Convention on Human Rights remains within the framework of Scottish domestic law,152 at 
least for a moment, there is a case to be made for the suggestion that the Scottish courts are 
obliged to resume the development of the actio iniuriarum, given that the right to privacy is 
explicitly protected by the Convention and its enacting UK statute.153 Whether privacy is 
regarded as a separable head under which an actio iniuriarum may be raised, or if it is 
regarded as no more than a manifestation of dignitas, it is plain that Scots law, by virtue of 
its connection to this actio, is in a better position to live up to its obligations under Article 8 
than the Common law jurisdictions of the United Kingdom. 
The desirability of a mechanism akin to the actio iniuriarum, and the need for such a 
mechanism in law, is demonstrated by virtue of the Harassment Act 1997. Though iniuria in 
the context of the actio iniuriarum is alien to the Common law tradition, English lawyers may 
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nevertheless find some guidance as to what constitutes ‘harassment’ within the context of the 
1997 Act with reference to that delict.154 Like iniuria, ‘harassment’ has ‘emerged as a wrong 
of astonishing versatility’;155 according to Birks, the word is ‘the best generic description of 
the act involved in any example of iniuria’.156 Thus, it is submitted, as the need for the actio 
iniuriarum is thought to be so pressing that a statutory equivalent was required in those 
jurisdictions which have no connection to it, the Scottish legal system – which may claim 
such a connection and offer remedy on the basis of this action – ought to make full use of the 
tools which are available to it.   
Harassment and Iniuria  
Whether or not enough remains of the actio iniuriarum for the Scottish common law 
to adequately address the problem of ‘revenge porn’, it is likely that Parliament’s statutory 
intervention in the form of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997,157 which also applies 
to England and Wales, can be used to offer remedy to victims of this conduct. The word 
‘harassment’ remains curiously undefined in the 1997 Act; as such, “a great deal is left to 
the wisdom of the courts to draw the line between the ordinary banter and badinage of 
everyday life and genuinely offensive and unacceptable behaviour”.158  
It is quite clear that, even without reference to iniuria, no court in the United Kingdom 
would regard the malicious publication of ‘revenge porn’ as anything other than genuinely 
offensive and utterly unacceptable. Accordingly, the 1997 Act appears, prima facie, to offer 
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some protection to victims of ‘revenge porn’. In England and Wales, the High Court may 
offer civil remedies to those affected by such conduct according to the 1997 Act159 and, even 
in the absence of the explicit criminalisation of ‘revenge porn’ effected by the 2015  
Act, it is plain that the 1998 Act could also be used to secure a criminal conviction, in England 
and Wales, per s.2 of that Act.   
While the 1997 Act may appear to be a sufficiently robust means of legally pursuing 
remedy, the problem with using this statute to pursue remedy for instances of ‘revenge porn’ 
is readily apparent. The sections of the Act which apply to England and Wales proscribe 
‘pursuing a course of conduct which amounts to harassment’,160 but define a ‘course of 
conduct’ as ‘conduct on at least two occasions’.161 The equivalent Scottish provisions reflect 
this definition.162 As such, though a case might be made that one who uploads (or, indeed, 
subsequently shares) more than one piece of sexually explicit material has pursued a course 
of conduct which amounts to harassment on more than one occasion, no remedy will be 
available for a victim of a single instance of ‘revenge porn’ under this heading. In addition, 
unless multiple images of one victim are posted and hosted on the same website, then there 
can be no action for harassment brought against the webmaster or controller of the website in 
question, absent the common law innovation of some civil equivalent of the Moorov 
doctrine.163 Accordingly, it is evident that the 1997 Act offers less civil protection to victims 
of ‘revenge porn’ than the actio iniuriarum can theoretically provide.  
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Conclusion  
  From the above, it is plain that the actio iniuriarum was, in Roman law, an 
astonishingly versatile delict. The term iniuria itself could be used in respect of a wide 
number of legal wrongs, but even when used in the specific context of an actio iniuriarum, 
almost any legal wrong causing affront to the extra-patrimonial interests of a legal person 
could be captured within the term’s purview. As long as an act was carried out in order to 
display or effect disrespect towards the victim, it could be categorised as an actionable iniuria. 
On this basis, it is plain that if the Roman law of Justinian were to be directly transposed into 
a 21st century society, any victim of any instance of ‘revenge porn’ would be entitled to raise 
an actio iniuriarum against the perpetrator and to seek the remedy of solatium in respect of 
the wrong.   
That the actio iniuriarum was received into Scots law is not controversial; nor is the 
fact that it has consistently found use in Scots law even during its worst times of neglect has 
been established. Since the law of Scotland has grossly neglected its connection to the actio 
iniuriarum since its reception, however, it is difficult to judge whether the action, as it exists 
in this jurisdiction, should be regarded as closer to the classical action as it existed in Roman 
law or the modern action as it exists in South Africa. Whatever the case in respect of this, it 
is plain that any instance of ‘revenge porn’ ought to be considered actionable under the actio 
iniuriarum in Scots law; the ‘gross invasion of the victim’, which necessarily occurs in all  
‘revenge porn’ cases, is such that a legal wrong, a lack of respect for the victim and the 
victim’s emotional distress might all be reasonably inferred. Thus, under any iteration or 
interpretation of the actio iniuriarum, it is plain that ‘revenge porn’ cases are actionable in 
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Scotland as a result of the harm which the publication and dissemination of such material 
inflicts on the victim’s dignitas.  
 The desirability of an action akin to the actio iniuriarum may be imputed by the fact 
that the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 introduced both a civil and a criminal concept 
which is comparable to the actio iniuriarum in England and Wales, where there was no 
equivalent action at common law. The Act similarly introduced the concept of ‘harassment’ 
into Scots law, but it is here concluded that the concept of ‘harassment’ is, in many respects, 
a (less versatile) statutory duplication in Scots law of the concept of iniuria. It is submitted, 
here, that, as a result of the 1997 Act, instances of ‘revenge porn’ may be actionable as 
‘harassment’ throughout Great Britain, but it is also concluded that the Scottish common law 
actio iniuriarum is preferable to the statutory concept of harassment, since the former action 
may be brought even in the absence of a ‘course of conduct’.   
  Ultimately, it is plain that the law should act to offer civil redress to victims of 
‘revenge porn’, just as it ought to criminally sanction those who disseminate such material. It 
is also clear that, though the ‘wrong’ of ‘revenge porn’ is ostensibly a 21st century 
phenomenon, the common law of Scotland is appropriately equipped to tackle it. This article 
has provided a consideration of ‘old law’ and how it can be utilised in order to solve 
contemporary problems; in order for this ‘old law’ to make a positive contribution to the 
modern Scots legal system, it must be utilised and plead by practitioners. Scotland’s 
connection to this aspect of the Civil law tradition has lay forgotten for generations. In light 
of the fact that it can now evidently be used to tackle an emergent societal problem, it is clear 
that it ought to lie forgotten no longer.        
